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Abstract—Channel estimation attacks can degrade the perfor-
mance of the legitimate system and facilitate eavesdropping. It is
known that pilot contamination can alter the legitimate transmit
precoder design and strengthen the quality of the received signal
at the eavesdropper, without being detected. In this paper, we
devise a technique which employs random pilots chosen from a
known set of phase-shift keying (PSK) symbols to detect pilot
contamination. The scheme only requires two training periods
without any prior channel knowledge. Our analysis demonstrates
that using the proposed technique in a massive MIMO system, the
detection probability of pilot contamination attacks can be made
arbitrarily close to 1. Simulation results reveal that the proposed
technique can significantly increase the detection probability and
is robust to noise power as well as the eavesdropper’s power.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been growing interest in physical layer security
since the introduction of the degraded wiretap channel and
secrecy capacity by the seminal work of Wyner [1]. Since
then, much work has been reported in the literature from
the viewpoints of both information theory [2]–[4] and signal
processing [5]–[10]. Deviating from the main research efforts
on secrecy capacity without considering on how channel state
information (CSI) is obtained, we are interested the practical
problem of detecting the attack on the channel estimation
process from an eavesdropper. More specifically, we consider a
multiple-antenna (MIMO) precoding system, where the eaves-
dropper (Eve) wants to overhear the communication from the
legitimate transmitter (Alice) to the intended receiver (Bob),
but does not attack Bob directly by, for instance, jamming.
Thus, detecting Eve becomes an important yet difficult task.
The impact of CSI on secrecy has been recently investigated.
A hybrid half-duplex adversary who either jams or eavesdrops
at a given time based on different level of CSI was studied
in [11], which illustrates that the main CSI is more valuable
for the adversary than the jamming CSI in both delay-limited
and ergodic scenarios. Intriguing counter-intuitive results were
given in [12] showing that more knowledge to the eavesdrop-
pers makes them more conservative in their attacks, and thus
less harmful and similarly, providing more knowledge to the
legitimate transmitter makes it more careful and less willing
to transmit, which reduces the expected secrecy capacity.
The need of channel estimation for MIMO precoding sys-
tems has put them at risk of active attack on channel estima-
tion. One such active eavesdropping attack was discussed in
[13], where Eve contaminates the channel estimation phase. In
particular, with a time-division-duplex (TDD) system, where
downlink and uplink channels are considered reciprocal, Eve
can inject the same pilot as Bob in the uplink channel training
phase. If Eve has sufficient transmit power, it can control the
channel estimation result at Alice; this will then change the
matched filter precoding used in the downlink transmission
phase. As such, Eve will not only strengthen its receive signal
but also degrade the signal quality at Bob, which is extremely
harmful for precoding systems. Worse, Eve’s attack cannot be
detected since its behavior is exactly the same as Bob’s.
In this paper, we propose a scheme to detect the presence of
Eve who attacks on the channel estimation using the method
in [13]. The main idea is to utilize random pilots for channel
estimation. We do not use pilot symbols as secret keys, which
are normally known in the standard, but rather assume the set
of pilot symbols to be publicly known. More specifically, we
use phase-shift keying (PSK) symbols as the pilot symbols
which are transmitted randomly. The scalar product between
the received vectors is exploited to detect the presence of Eve.
First, we describe our scheme for any number of antennas at
the base station, and derive a geometric region in the complex
plane based on Gaussian approximation that can be used
for detection. Then the potential of the emerging very large-
scale MIMO (a.k.a. massive MIMO technique) is investigated
for our scheme. Massive MIMO has received great attention
for its impressive gain in throughput and energy efficiency
[14]. Interested readers are referred to a tutorial in [15]. One
property particularly useful to our detection algorithm is that
with massive MIMO, the received thermal noise at Alice in
the uplink can be averaged out so that the detection can be
much simplified with improved performance. We illustrate that
with massive MIMO and large constellation size, Eve can be
detected with a probability arbitrarily close to one.1
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we introduce our system model. Section III presents our
detection algorithm based on random training along with a
theoretical analysis of its behavior in the presence of received
noise. Based on the theoretical analysis, Section IV constructs
1It is worth noting that when Eve is completely passive without transmitting
any signal, detecting its existence is more difficult. A method was proposed
in [16] to detect passive eavesdropping from the local oscillator power leaked
from Eve’s RF front end. This is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Fig. 1. Alice is a multi-antenna base station sending messages to the intended
user Bob but Eve is the malicious single-antenna eavesdropper.
the detection regions. Section V studies the impact of massive
MIMO on the detection. In Section VI, simulation results are
provided and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a TDD system with a base station Alice, equipped
with M antennas and (possibly) several single-antenna users,
as depicted in Figure 1. Due to TDD, it is sufficient to focus on
one intended user Bob, awaiting information from Alice. Alice
adapts its precoder design to match the channel to Bob for
enhanced performance. Due to reciprocity, channel estimation
can be done in the uplink where Bob sends pilot symbols to
Alice. There exists a malicious single-antenna terminal Eve to
overhear the communication between Alice and Bob.
Let gB = dBhB be the M × 1 vector channel from Bob
to Alice and gE = dEhE be the M × 1 vector channel from
Eve to Alice. The elements in hB and hE are independent
complex Gaussians with zero mean and unit variance, i.e.,
they represent small-scale fading. The scalars dB and dE are
the large-scale fading coefficients for path loss and shadowing.
Understanding the importance of uplink channel estimation,
instead of passively listening to the legitimate transmission, a
more effective strategy for Eve is to contaminate the channel
estimation phase. Next we briefly review a pilot contamination
attack proposed in [13]. At training time slot j, the pilots sent
by Bob and Eve are pBj ∈ A and pEj ∈ A, respectively, where
A denotes the set of all training symbols. For fixed training
scheme and most practical applications, the pilot set A used by
Bob is publicly known and typically specified in the standard.
Hence, in this case, Eve can transmit the same pilots as Bob,
i.e., pBj = pEj = pj . The received signal at Alice becomes
yj =
√
PBpjdBhB +
√
PEpjdEhE + nj
= (
√
PBdBhB +
√
PEdEhE)pj + nj , (1)
where each element in nj is a complex Gaussian random
variable with zero mean and variance N0. Furthermore, PB
and PE denote the average training power used by Bob
and Eve, respectively. We assume that the large-scale fading
coefficients dB and dE are unknown in advance to Alice.
From (1), it is impossible for Alice to decide whether the
received signal strength is due to Bob’s channel only or Eve’s
as well. If Eve’s channel is strong or its training power is
high, it can dominate the channel estimation at Alice and
even worse, during the transmission phase, Alice will use a
precoder that adapts to this erroneous channel estimate. Thus,
it is necessary for Alice to detect the presence of Eve and
pause any transmission to Bob during Eve’s presence.2
The work in [13] only analyzed error rate performance for
the pilot contamination attack, and outlined a detection scheme
(without analysis) that measures the variance of the received
signal at Alice during a sufficiently long training period.
Instead, we propose an efficient detection scheme that achieves
plausible performance under the pilot contamination attack
with only two training slots. We also rigorously characterize
the performance of the proposed detection algorithm.
III. RANDOM PILOT DETECTION SCHEME
Although it is difficult for Alice to differentiate whether the
pilots are from Bob only or contaminated by Eve, if Alice has
the knowledge of dB and dE , and they differ significantly, sig-
nal strength deviations from what is expected can be observed,
and detection probability increases. Nevertheless, deterministic
knowledge of Bob’s pilots is detrimental for detection of Eve.
Instead, if Bob transmits pilots randomly, then the probability
of observing deviations from the expected signal increases.
This observation forms the basis of our random pilot detection
scheme, which is described next. We want to emphasize that
our scheme does not need the knowledge of dB and dE .
A. Random Pilot Detection Scheme: Noiseless Case
To illustrate the idea, let us first discard the noise in the
received signal. The pilot alphabet A is assumed to be a PSK
alphabet, with N PSK symbols A = {ei2pik/N : 0 ≤ k ≤
N−1}. We assume that 2 training slots are used. Suppose that
Eve is active in both slots. Then the received signals during
the two training slots are, respectively, given by{
y1 =
√
PBp
B
1
dBhB +
√
PEp
E
1
dEhE ,
y2 =
√
PBp
B
2
dBhB +
√
PEp
E
2
dEhE .
(2)
Next, we form the (scaled) inner product of the two received
vectors:
zE
12
4
=
y∗
1
y2
M
=
1
M
(√
PBp
B
1
dBhB +
√
PEp
E
1
dEhE
)∗
(√
PBp
B
2
dBhB +
√
PEp
E
2
dEhE
)
(3)
where the superscript (·)∗ denotes Hermitian conjugate. In-
stead, if Eve is not active, the cross product y∗
1
y2/M becomes
z12
4
= PB
(pB
1
)∗(pB
2
)d2B‖hB‖2
M
. (4)
2Note that this argument assumes perfect synchronization of Eve and Bobs’
transmissions. Any synchronization imperfections could potentially be useful
in the detection process, but they are out of scope in this work.
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Fig. 2. Geometrical interpretation of the random pilot detection scheme. In
the figure, Eve is detected since zE
12
is not located on one of the 4 dotted
lines defined by a PSK symbol and the origin.
We have the following discussion based on (3) and (4).
• In the absence of Eve, Alice receives z12 = y∗1y2/M ,
which is a scaled PSK symbol.
• If Eve is present, then Alice receives zE
12
= y∗
1
y2/M .
Hence, for Eve to remain undetected, zE
12
must be a scaled
PSK symbol. Geometrically, this means that zE
12
must lie
in one of the N/2 lines (henceforth called PSK lines)
defined by the origin and each PSK symbol. See Figure
2.
With these observations in mind, the detection procedure can
be formulated as: if y∗
1
y2 is on a PSK line, Eve is absent;
otherwise, Eve is present. The following theorem characterizes
the detection performance of the proposed scheme.
Theorem 1. In the absence of noise, Eve can be detected with
probability 1− 1N .
Proof: It follows that
zE
12
=
1
M
(pB
1
)∗pB
2
(
√
PBdBhB +
√
PEp
E
1
(pB
1
)∗dEhE)
∗
(
√
PBdBhB +
√
PEp
E
2
(pB
2
)∗dEhE). (5)
The product
√
PB(p
B
1
)∗pB
2
is a scaled PSK symbol. Hence,
in order for zE
12
to be a scaled PSK symbol, the angle of the
vector scalar product in (5) must equal the angle of some PSK
symbol. Due to the randomness of hB and hE , if pE1 (pB1 )∗ 6=
pE
2
(pB
2
)∗, the angle of the above vector scalar product will,
with probability one, not be equal to the angle of any PSK
symbol. As such, zE
12
will not be a scaled PSK symbol with
probability one. Instead, if pE
1
(pB
1
)∗ = pE
2
(pB
2
)∗, zE
12
will be a
scaled PSK symbol for any realization of hB and hE . Hence,
for Eve to remain undetected, Eve’s pilot in the second time
slot must equal pE
2
= pE
1
(pB
1
)∗pB
2
. Since pE
1
(pB
1
)∗pB
2
is a
random PSK symbol, Eve must guess the pilot pE
1
(pB
1
)∗pB
2
.
Thus, the probability of Eve remaining undetected is 1/N , i.e.,
the detection probability is 1− 1/N .
Theorem 1 shows that by increasing the alphabet size, the
detection probability converges to 1 if no noise is present. Note
that no information about the large-scale fading coefficients is
assumed, and this holds throughout this paper.
B. Random Pilot Detection Scheme: Noisy Case
So far, we have assumed that noise was not present. Next,
the impact of noise, hence the model in (1), is considered.
If Eve is not contaminating, the scalar product z12 becomes
z12 =
PBd
2
B‖hB‖2
M
(pB
1
)∗pB
2
+ n12. (6)
where
n12 =
√
PBdB(p
B
1
)∗
h∗Bn2
M
+
√
PBdBp
B
2
n∗
1
hB
M
+
n∗
1
n2
M (7)
is the equivalent noise. The distribution of n12 is complicated
and in the following lemma we study its property in the large
antenna case.
Lemma 1. For a given realization of hB , define
sM
4
=
N0
M2
(MN0 + 2PBd
2
B‖hB‖2).
Then
lim
M→∞
n12√
sM
d→ CN (0, 1).
Proof: Due to space limitation, we sketch a brief outline
of the proof only. First of all, write
n12 =
1
M
(n1 +
√
PBdB(p
B
1
)hB)
∗(n2 +
√
PBdBp
B
2
hB)
− PBd2B(pB1 )∗pB2 ‖hB‖2. (8)
The scalar product in (8) is between two independent Gaussian
vectors, with means
√
PBdB(p
B
1
)hB and
√
PBdBp
B
2
hB , and
both with variance N0, respectively. Hence, the mean of n12 is
E{n12} = 0. Also, n12 is a sum of M complex-valued normal
product Gaussian variables. It can be shown that the Lyapunov
condition in the Lyapunov central limit theorem is satisfied for
the forth moment for this sum. Thus, we can conclude that in
the limit M →∞, this sum converges to a complex Gaussian
random variable with mean 0 and variance sM .
Lemma 1 shows that for a fixed channel realization, the in-
terference variable n12 converges (in distribution) to a complex
Gaussian variable with zero mean and variance sM . Results in
Figure 3 verify that this approximation is justified for as few as
M = 5 antennas. Combining (6) and Lemma 1, it holds that in
the absence of Eve, z12 equals a scaled PSK symbol disturbed
by complex Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance sM .
On the other hand, if Eve is contaminating the pilots, the
cross product zE
12
equals
zE
12
=
1
M
(√
PBp
B
1
dBhB +
√
PEp
E
1
dEhE
)∗
(√
PBp
B
2
dBhB +
√
PEp
E
2
dEhE
)
+ nE
12
, (9)
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Fig. 3. The cumulative density functions (cdf) of the real-valued part
Re{n12} of n12 and a Gaussian cdf with mean 0 and variance sM in Lemma
1. In this plot, PBd2B‖hB‖
2 = 713.1196 and M = 5. The complex-valued
part of n12 gives the same cdf as the real-valued part. As seen, the empirical
cdf of Re{n12} coincides with a Gaussian cdf, as predicted by Lemma 1.
where the equivalent noise is
nE
12
=
1
M
(√
PBdB(p
B
1
)∗h∗Bn2 +
√
PEdE(p
E
1
)∗h∗En2
+
√
PBdBp
B
2
n∗
1
hB +
√
PEdEp
E
2
n∗
1
hE + n
∗
1
n2
)
. (10)
Similar to Lemma 1, we can prove the following result.
Lemma 2. Define
sEM
4
=
N0
M2
(MN0 + ‖
√
PBdBp
B
1
hB +
√
PEdEp
E
1
hE‖2
+ ‖
√
PBdBp
B
2
hB +
√
PEdEp
E
2
hE‖2). (11)
For a fixed realization of the pilots and the channels,
lim
M→∞
nE
12√
sEM
d→ CN (0, 1). (12)
Lemma 2 shows that for a given realization of the pilots and
the channels, the interference nE
12
converges (in distribution)
to a complex Gaussian variable with zero mean and variance
sEM . As with n12, nE12 can be approximated very well with its
limiting distribution for as few as 5 antennas.
Applying the same analysis in the proof of Theorem 1, if
pE
1
(pB
1
)∗ = pE
2
(pB
2
)∗, then zE
12
will be equal to a scaled PSK
symbol plus nE
12
. The variance of nE
12
can be larger or smaller
than the variance of n12, depending on the pilots and the
channel realizations. Hence, in this case, the situation is similar
as that in the absence of Eve, and the probability of detecting
Eve decreases. On the other hand, if pE
1
(pB
1
)∗ 6= pE
2
(pB
2
)∗, zE
12
will be equal to a symbol different from a PSK symbol plus
nE
12
; the variance of nE
12
will vary in the same way as in the
previous case. However, the probability of detecting Eve will
now increase, since the probability of zE
12
not being a scaled
PSK symbol is larger.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DETECTION REGIONS
The results in the previous section suggest how to construct
the detection regions, i.e., the regions in which Alice decides
whether Eve is contaminating or not, depending on if the scalar
product y∗
1
y2/M is outside or inside the detection region,
respectively. Since the scalar product z12 in (6) equals the
sum of a PSK symbol scaled with cB = PBd2B‖hB‖2/M and
Gaussian noise, Alice decides that Eve is not contaminating
if the scalar product y∗
1
y2/M is within a certain distance
r(cB) from some PSK line. r(cB) needs to increase with the
scaling cB , because the variance sM of the Gaussian noise n12
increases with cB . From the signal space perspective, Gaussian
noise corresponds to a circle centered around 0 with radius√
sM . This property leads us to construct r(cB) as3
r(cB) = c
√
N0(MN0 + 2cB)
M
, (13)
Different values of the constant c will give smaller or larger
detection regions. This parameter is fine-tuned in Section VI
in order to achieve the best performance.
In order to detect Eve, Alice performs the following proce-
dure for each realization of the scalar product y12 = y∗1y2/M :
Set p = 1.
For each PSK symbol q ∈ A
Define f(x) 4= |y12 − xq| − r(x).
If there is an x such that f(x) < 0, set p = 0.
Otherwise continue.
End
If p = 1 after the above procedure completes, Alice decides
that Eve is present; otherwise, it decides that Eve is not
present. The geometrical interpretation of this procedure is to
check whether there is a PSK symbol scaled with x, for which
y12 is inside a circle with radius r(x) centered at this scaled
PSK symbol. In other words, it checks whether y12 is inside
the detection region defined by the distance function r(x).
V. ENHANCED DETECTION USING MASSIVE MIMO
Massive MIMO has received increasing attention lately. The
main idea is to let the number of antennas at Alice, M , go
to infinity. This is especially useful if unwanted interference
is given by scalar products of independent vectors with zero
mean, since the strong law of large numbers indicates that this
type of interference goes to 0 as M approaches infinity. As
a result, the interference can be removed. On the other hand,
desired random quantities, such as received signal power, con-
verge to non-zero scalar numbers. Beside these nice properties,
simple transmission and detection schemes can be used to
achieve the optimal performance [15].
We will now investigate how our random pilot detection
scheme can be enhanced by massive MIMO in the presence
of noise. To this end, we study z12 and zE12 in the noisy case,
when M → ∞. The strong law of large numbers implies
3Finding the optimal expression of r(cB) is left for future work.
that the scalar product between different vectors in (6) and
(9), converges to 0. Conversely, ‖hB‖2/M and ‖hE‖2/M
converge to 1. Hence, it holds that
lim
M→∞
z12 = p
B
1
(pB
2
)∗d2B (14)
and
lim
M→∞
zE
12
= pB
1
(pB
2
)∗d2B + p
E
1
(pE
2
)∗d2E . (15)
Note that as before, in the absence of Eve, (15) is a scaled
PSK symbol. Similarly to Theorem 1, we have the following
theorem about the detection probability.
Theorem 2. When M → ∞, Eve can be detected with
probability 1− 2/N .
Proof: Write (15) as
lim
M→∞
zE
12
= pB
1
(pB
2
)∗(d2B + (p
B
1
)∗pB
2
pE
1
(pE
2
)∗d2E). (16)
Eve will be undetected if the angle of the above product is
that of a PSK symbol. Since dB and dE are random variables,
the probability of this event is 0 if (pB
1
)∗pB
2
pE
1
(pE
2
)∗ 6= ±1.
Instead, if (pB
1
)∗pB
2
pE
1
(pE
2
)∗ = ±1, the angle of the product is
always a PSK symbol. Hence, for Eve to remain undetected, in
the second time slot it must guess the pilot pE
2
= (pB
1
)∗pB
2
pE
1
or pE
2
= −(pB
1
)∗pB
2
pE
1
, which happens with probability 2/N .
Thus, the detection probability is 1− 2/N .
Comparing Theorems 1 and 2, we see that the probability of
not detecting Eve is doubled with massive MIMO. However,
as in the noiseless case, the detection probability can be made
arbitrarily close to 1 by increasing the alphabet size. Moreover,
this performance is guaranteed for any noise power and that
only two training slots are needed to achieve this performance.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of our detection scheme, we
simulate the detection probability and the false-alarm proba-
bility. False-alarm probability is defined as the probability of
detecting Eve, given that Eve is not present. A high false-
alarm probability results in pausing periods for Alice even in
the absence of Eve, which decreases the average throughput to
Bob. Hence, a high detection probability and a low false-alarm
probability is the desired goal for detection schemes.
Figure 4 shows the detection and false-alarm probabilities
versus SNR of our scheme for 8 antennas at Alice, N = 4 and
N = 8 PSK, and different transmission power at Eve. Here,
SNR is defined as SNR = PB/N0. Moreover, we assume a
large-scale fading scenario as in [13], i.e., dB = dE = 1.
As expected, the detection probability increases with SNR,
while the false-alarm probability decreases; in the high SNR
region, we obtain the performance of Theorem 1. Increasing
the alphabet size deteriorates the performance for small SNRs,
but improves it for high SNRs due to Theorem 1. Interestingly,
when Eve’s transmit power is much larger than Bob’s, our
scheme provides excellent performance. The reason is that Eve
“reveals” itself more, and our scheme has the ability to identify
this. Hence, beside being robust to noise, it is also robust to
power variations in Eve.
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Fig. 4. Detection (DP) and false-alarm (FAP) probabilities vs. SNR. The
detection probability increases with SNR, while the false-alarm probability
decreases. Larger alphabets converge to a larger value, but at a slower pace
than smaller alphabets. Moreover, the scheme is robust to power variations at
Eve as demonstrated by the curve with circular markers.
Emulating a massive MIMO scenario, Figure 5 shows the
impact of large antennas on our detection scheme. In the limit
of infinite antennas, we obtain the performance given by The-
orem 2. Compared to Figure 4, the performance is improved
with many antennas. Note that the false-alarm probability is
roughly almost 0 for all curves. Larger alphabets give better
performance for high SNR, but they have a slower convergence
rate. However, increasing the number of antennas to M = 400
gives better convergence rate, which is demonstrated by the
black curve for N = 64 (this curve would converge slower
to its limit for M = 200). Note that the curves are above
the 1 − 2/N probability in Theorem 2. The reason for this
is that M is still a finite number, and thus the scalar product
h∗BhE/M between Bob’s and Eve’s channels is not exactly 0.
Therefore, when SNR→∞, the performance is governed by
Theorem 1 instead. Hence, as a result, a detection probability
larger than 1 − 2/N can be achieved for high SNRs. As in
Figure 4, increasing Eve’s transmission power makes it easier
to detect her presence. Note that the black curve confirms the
results in Theorems 1 and 2, namely that our scheme can
achieve detection probabilities arbitrarily close to 1.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented novel detection schemes based
on random pilots to combat the pilot contamination attack
by a malicious user. The detection schemes require only two
training slots to perform detection at the base station without
any prior channel knowledge; thus only a small overhead is
incurred. In the absence of noise (high SNR regime) and with
large alphabet cardinality, we have revealed that our scheme
achieves perfect detection. For a finite number of antennas and
with the presence of additive white Gaussian noise, we also
studied the detection region. Simulations results have shown
that the detection scheme provides a high detection probability
and low false alarm probability. The detection problem is
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Fig. 5. Detection (DP) and false-alarm (FAP) probabilities vs. SNR for M =
200 and M = 400. The detection probability increases with SNR, while the
false-alarm probability is 0. Larger alphabets have slower convergence rate,
which can be improved by increasing the number of antennas at Alice. All
curves converge to their limit 1 − 1/N predicted by Theorem 1, since the
scalar product h∗
B
hE/M is not exactly 0 for M = 200 and M = 400.
further enhanced by massive MIMO techniques and it is shown
that our scheme again achieves perfect detection.
This area is not well explored. Future work includes the
study of the optimal distance expressions for r(d2B‖hB‖2)
for the finite case, which is crucial for the performance of
the detection scheme. Another important direction is to study
the impact of the training phase duration on the performance.
A training duration of K slots gives
(
K
2
)
different scalar
products, from which more information can be deduced about
Eve’s presence at a cost of increased overhead and complexity.
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